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1. Introduction
Labor market trends in OECD countries have been very different since the early 2000’s.
While at the beginning of the first decade of the new millennium, the US and the UK
experienced low levels of unemployment (around 5% between 1998 and 2005) and robust
economic growth, despite the cyclical downturn after the end of the New Economy boom
(with average real GDP growth rates of 3.2% for the US and the UK over the period between
21998 and 2005)1, Germany’s economy was characterized by sluggish growth (averaging just
about 1.2% over the same period, with even negative growth in 2003)2 and high
unemployment rates (increasing from 9.2% in 1998 to 11.1% in 2005, and averaging at
around 9% over the period). At the time, commentators and economists alike referred to
Germany as the `sick man of Europe’.3 Although part of this may have been due to Germany
still suffering from the high economic cost as a consequence of German reunification, many
believed that Germany might have lost its competitive edge in a new global economy, due to
its inflexible labor market and rigid product market regulations.4 Thus, the common
perception was that, in order to overcome its severe economic problems, Germany had to
improve labor market flexibility, by abolishing rigid labor market institutions and product
market regulations. If only the German economy could improve flexibility, then economic
growth and lower levels of unemployment would follow suit.
Germany today, after the Great Recession, seems to be an entirely different country.
Today’s commentators speak of the “Economic Superstar” and refer to Germany as being in
a “League of its own”. The number of unemployed fell from about 5 Million in 2005 to about
3 Million in 2008, with an unemployment rate amounting to 7.7% in 2010 (6.6% in West
Germany), as opposed to 9.6% in the US.5 In contrast to most of its European neighbors and
the US, Germany experienced almost no increase in unemployment during the Great
Recession, despite a sharp decline in GDP in 2008 and 2009. Moreover, Germany’s exports
reached an all-time record in 2011, while other countries suffered large and increasing trade
1 Source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?display=default.
2 Source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?display=default.
3 See for instance The Economist, November 2004, http://www.economist.com/node/3352024 and Paul
Krugman, http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/kompete.html.
4 See for instance Krugman’s comment, where he singles out inflexibilities inherent to German culture, citing
Immanuel Kant's categorical imperative vs. William James' pragmatism.
5 Source of German figures: Bundesagentur für Arbeit (2011); US figure: Bureau of Labor Statistics,
http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000.
3deficits.6 Between 2010 and 2011, German exports grew by 15.7% to a level of 1,738 Billion
US dollars, which amounts to about 50 percent of its GDP (7.7% of world exports) in 2011. In
the same year, exports represent about 14 percent of GDP (9.2% of world exports) for the
US, and about 32 percent of GDP (3.5% of world exports) for the UK.7 Even the Euro crisis
seems so far not to have been able to stop Germany’s strengthening economy and its new
‘employment miracle’.8 In sum, Germany has transformed itself from an ailing economy, the
“sick man of Europe”, slacking behind other OECD countries, to the “Economic Superstar” in
less than a decade.
What has happened? Some have argued that the increase in competitiveness in
Germany and the decrease in unemployment has been the result of a series of legislative
labor market reforms that started in the mid-2000’s, the so-called Hartz Reforms (see e.g.
Rinne and Zimmermann, 2013). We argue in this paper that these reforms may have played
a role in reducing the fiscal burden of the high level of unemployment (and of German
unification) and in activating the long-term unemployed. However, these reforms did not
play a decisive role for the transformation of the German economy, namely the restructuring
of its labor market and the increase in competitiveness that has helped German exports.9
We instead argue and present evidence that, contrary to widespread beliefs, the innate
flexibility (to be precise: the use of the innate flexibility margins in times of weakening
bargaining power of employees) of Germany’s labor market institutions has been the main
reason for Germany’s economic success over the last decade.
6 Source: WTO, http://stat.wto.org/StatisticalProgram/WsdbExport.aspx?Language=E.
7 Source: World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS.
8 See Möller (2010) and Burda and Hunt (2011) who investigate why employment did not fall in Germany in
2008/2009 despite the strong decline in GDP.
9 See also Carlin and Soskice (2008, 2009), who argue that it is restructuring by the private sector itself using
traditional German institutions based on employer-worker cooperation, and not government labor market and
welfare state reforms that are to be credited for the German recovery.
4We explore several pieces of evidence to investigate these issues. We first show that
Germany’s competitiveness, measured as relative unit labor cost started to dramatically
increase in the early- to mid-1990’s. This trend coincided with an increase in wage inequality
below the median and low wage growth overall, a trend which precedes the Hartz reforms
by about 10 years. In a next step, we investigate in more detail whether this increase in
wage inequality and the decline in real wages below the median helped to improve
Germany’s competitiveness. A first piece of evidence seems to contradict this hypothesis:
contrary to other sectors of the economy, the manufacturing sector—the backbone of the
German export industry accounting for 80% of total exports—experienced only a small
increase in wage inequality below the median until the early 2000’s, and a decrease in real
wages only at the lower percentiles of the wage distribution since the early 2000’s.
Nevertheless, we demonstrate that unit labor costs in end products have decreased
considerably also in this sector. Using input-output relationships, we first show that this is
partly due to those industries that provide inputs to the tradable manufacturing sector (in
particular tradable services) having experienced declines in real wages and rising inequality,
particularly at the lower end. Our findings further highlight that the rapid increase in
productivity in the manufacturing sector, relative to the increase in wages in that sector, was
a second important factor which contributed to the decline in unit labor costs.
Having demonstrated that the moderate increase in the level of real wages relative to
productivity, in both the manufacturing sector and the other sectors in the economy, has
played an important role in the favorable evolution of unit labor cost in the German tradable
manufacturing industry, we then investigate the mechanisms that allowed for wage
restraint, and the dramatic decrease in real wages at the lower end of the wage distribution.
5The specific feature of the German system of industrial relations that we stress is that it is
not rooted in legislation and it is not governed by the political process, but laid out in
contracts and mutual agreements between the three main labor market parties, these being
employer associations, trade unions, and works councils. We particularly highlight three
pertinent features of Germany’s labor market institutions: i) there is no statutory minimum
wage, but a framework of negotiated base wages; ii) employers can leave union contracts
that regulate wages and working hours – or may threaten to do so to obtain wage
concessions; and iii) even within union wage contracts negotiated at the industry level, there
is scope for wage and working hours flexibility at the firm level, if workers’ representatives
agree to this. We demonstrate that the share of workers covered by any kind of union
agreement sharply declined, while firm-level deviations from industry-wide union
agreements sharply increased since the mid-1990’s, leading to an unprecedented
localization of the wage setting process, from the industry level to the firm level. Hence, this
system – removed from the legislator and therefore the median voter—was not at all rigid,
as commonly believed, but in fact offered various margins of flexibility—provided that the
key decision makers mutually agree to make use of them. This is in contrast to many of
Germany’s neighbors where the statutory minimum wage is often high, where union wages
and work hour regulations apply to all firms in the industry, and where institutional change
therefore requires broad consensus along the political spectrum.10
10 Boeri (2011) provides a recent assessment of the political economy of labor market reforms with a particular
focus on Southern Europe. He argues that the political process often allows only for two-tier reforms (affecting
only a subset of all employees) instead of complete reforms, which may not result in an increase of competi-
tiveness. See also Carlin (2012) for an insightful comparison between the responses of German vs other Euro-
pean wage setting institutions to the introduction of the Euro.
6In the last part of our analysis, we address the question as to why the inherent flexibility
in Germany’s labor market institutions was so apparent only from the mid-1990’s onwards.11
We argue that this was due to mainly two factors. First, the dramatic cost of German
unification burdened the German economy in an unprecedented way, and was partly
responsible for the dismal macroeconomic performance of the German economy for more
than a decade. Second, the fall of the Berlin wall gave German employers access to
neighboring East European countries that were formerly locked away behind the Iron
Curtain, and that were characterized by low labor cost, yet stable institutions and political
structures.12 Both factors changed the power equilibrium between employer and employee
associations and forced trade unions to react in a far more flexible way than many would
ever have expected. Thus, while also preparing the political ground for labor market reforms
introduced in the mid-2000’s by the Social-Democratic/Green government of Gerhard
Schröder, the key changes that led to increased competitiveness of German industry started
much earlier, in the mid-1990’s.
2. How Did Germany improve its Competitiveness?
2.1 Relative Unit Labor Cost
In figure 1 we plot the relative unit labor costs (RULC) for a country’s overall economy
adjusted for the changing composition of the markets in which it competes, for a selection of
countries, in dollar terms. This index is computed as the relative change in the unit labor
11 See Streeck (1997) for a fascinating description and history of German economic institutions. Streeck points
out that these institutions are important in explaining Germany’s international competitiveness in the decade
before unification.
12 Burda (2000) predicted that the EU-accession of Eastern European countries would benefit the labor markets
in the old EU member countries (including Germany), partly by fostering a reduction of labor market rigidities
in these countries.
7costs over time (normalized to 1995) translated into US dollars at the current exchange rate
compared to a weighted average of a country’s trading partners. 13 The weights of the
trading partners adjust annually to changes in trading patterns. If a country does not change
its competitiveness relative to other countries, this index would remain constant. An
increase in this index indicates a real effective appreciation and a corresponding
deterioration of the competitive position. Competitiveness can be improved in three ways:
First, by decreasing the wage per worker (or per hour); second, by increasing productivity
(per worker or per hour); and finally, by nominal depreciation of one’s currency.
Figure 1 shows that – from the beginning of the observation window onwards, in 1995 –
Germany’s competitiveness has persistently improved, while the competitiveness of some of
its main trading partners within the EU – Spain, Italy, and France – has deteriorated (Spain
and Italy) or remained close to the 1995 position (France). The UK’s competitiveness has
likewise deteriorated, but improved dramatically between 2007 and 2009, which is due to
the sharp depreciation of the British Pound against other currencies. Such a depreciation
was not possible for France, Italy and Spain, as they share the Euro as a common currency
with Germany, which leaves these countries only with two options to improve
competitiveness: wage restraint, or improvement in productivity. The US has also lost
competitiveness relative to Germany in the late 1990’s as the euro depreciated following its
13 This index accumulates the annual change in the relative unit labor costs of country i compared to a
weighted average of its main trading partners where labor costs are translated into dollars and the weights are
adjusted annually to the change in trade pattern. The annual change in logs is calculated as ∆log(ܴܷܮܥ௜௧)=
∆log(ܷܮܥ௜௧ ௜݁௧)- ∑୨ஷ୧ ௜݃௝
௧ି ଵ ∆log(ܷܮܥ௝௧ ௝݁௧) where ܷܮܥ௜௧ =( ݓ௜௧ ܮ௜௧)/ܻ௜௧ are the unit labor cost for country i in
period t, computed as the total wage bill ݓ௜௧ ܮ௜௧ divided by the value added of the country’s industry ௜ܻ௧. The
unit labour costs are translated into in US dollars using the exchange rate ௜݁௧. Both the unit labor costs and the
exchange rates are defined as index relative to some base year. The weighting scheme ௜݃௝
௧ି ଵ takes account of
the structure of competition in both export and import markets of the goods sector of those countries, and it
adjusts on a year-by-year basis. See OECD Economic Outlook, Volume 2012 Issue 2 - No. 92 and OECD Econom-
ic Outlook Sources and Methods (http://www.oecd.org/eco/sources-and-methods) for details on the method
of calculation.
8introduction, but improved consistently after the 2001 recession, partly achieved through a
dollar depreciation (for instance, while the €/$ Exchange rate was around 1 in 2001, it
deteriorated to 0.8 in 2009). Thus, figure 1 demonstrates that the German economy has
continuously gained competitiveness. This was not achieved through nominal devaluation,
as that would have improved competitiveness also in countries like France, Italy and Spain
(who are members of the Eurozone). Rather, it was achieved because wages grew at a
slower pace than productivity.
2.2 Wage Trends and Wage Inequality
How have wages developed in Germany over that period? Figure 2 shows the evolution
of real wages in West Germany from 1990 onwards.14 The figure illustrates the dramatic
development in wage inequality in West Germany over the past 1 ½ decades, which has
been demonstrated in Dustmann et al. (2009) (see also Antonczyk et al., 2010 and Card et
al., 2013).15 Real wages at the 15th percentile fell dramatically from the mid-1990’s onwards,
and moved away from wages at the median. From the early 2000’s onwards, also median
real wages started to fall, and only wages at the top of the distribution continued to rise.
If the increase in wage inequality and the modest growth in wages overall —and in
particular the dramatic decline in real wages at the bottom of the wage distribution—has
contributed to the favorable evolution of unit labor costs in Germany relative to the US and
other EU countries, then one should expect this development to have been particularly
pronounced in the tradable manufacturing sector – the backbone of the German exporting
14 We provide details on the data sets used in Appendix A.
15 Notice that all wage figures that we report stand for West Germany (although, henceforth, we refer to them
most of the times as “Germany”), as developments in East Germany are affected in a specific way by the transi-
tion after German unification, and East Germany has played a minor role for the overall international competi-
tiveness of the German economy.
9industries accounting for 80% of German exports. Breaking down the evolution of real wag-
wages along the wage distribution into three sectors, non-tradables, tradable
manufacturing, and tradable services, a first glance seems to contradict this hypothesis.16 In
stark contrast to the non-tradable sector and tradable service sector, real wages in the
tradable manufacturing sector rose at all percentiles of the wage distribution until the mid-
2000’s, and afterwards continued to rise at the median and the 85th percentile. Quite
remarkably, real wages in the non-tradable sector hardly increased at all at any part of the
wage distribution during the 1990’s and started to decline from the early 2000’s onwards
even at the 85th percentile, but particularly so at the 15th percentile. The sharpest increase in
inequality occurred in the tradable service sector, where between 1990 and 2008 real wages
did not show an increase at the median, increased by 12 percent at the 85th percentile and
declined by almost 15 percent at the 15th percentile. Thus, these figures do not seem to lend
strong support to the hypothesis that wage restraint in the manufacturing sector was an
important factor in improving competitiveness in that sector. However, this neglects at least
two factors. First, the end product in manufacturing contains a large share of inputs
produced in other sectors: the value added in manufacturing is only roughly 1/3 of the value
of the end product, the reminder being contributed through inputs from other industries,
either domestically, or from abroad.17 Hence, the manufacturing industry may have
benefitted from low wages in other domestic sectors or from cheap imports from abroad.
Second, the manufacturing sector may have experienced increases in productivity which
16 We define tradable and non-tradable sectors based on the amount of total exports of a sector in 1995.
“Tradable manufacturing” are all those tradable sectors that belong to the manufacturing sector, and “tradable
services” are all other tradable sectors. Details on the construction of these categories can be found in Appen-
dix A.
17 The literature focuses almost exclusively on the role of imports of intermediate products from abroad (see
e.g. Geishecker 2006, Sinn 2006, OECD 2007, chapter 3, and OECD 2012, chapter 3).
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exceeded the increases in productivity in the other domestic sectors as well as the increases
in wages in the manufacturing sector.
2.3 Real Wages, Restructuring, and Unit Labor Cost in the Manufacturing Sector
Table 1 provides some preliminary evidence that both factors may be at play. The table
first shows that in contrast to the non-tradable and tradable service sector, the tradable
manufacturing [henceforth abbreviated by manufacturing] sector has been continuously
shrinking in employment since 1995, while it has kept its share in value added at current
prices (produced in Germany) roughly constant. These developments point to larger
productivity increases in the manufacturing sector than in the other sectors (which is
common across countries, see e.g Pilat et al. 2006), as the same amount of output is now
produced with fewer workers.18 The table further highlights that in contrast to the other
sectors, the share in production value in the manufacturing sector considerably exceeds its
share in value added, and this difference has been steadily increasing throughout the
observation period. This suggests that the manufacturing sector indeed relies on inputs from
the other two domestic sectors, and may thus have benefitted from the low wage gains in
these sectors. It further suggests that the manufacturing sector has outsourced part of its
production—either by increasing inputs from domestic sectors, or by increasing imports
from abroad. 19
18 Pilat et al. (2006) point out that the relatively fast productivity growth in manufacturing is associated with
relative declines of the prices for manufacturing products (this is Baumol’s cost disease). Thus, shares in value
added at current prices understate the share of value added at constant prices in manufacturing to total value
added at constant prices, and it is even more remarkable that manufacturing in Germany has retained its share
in value added at current prices.
19 Agency workers provide another source margin of flexible labor input, which has grown in Germany from
1.1% of employment in 2003 to 2.6% in 2008 (Spermann 2011, Figure 4).
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Table 2 reports the value of inputs over the value of output (Panel A), the value of
domestic inputs over the value of output (Panel B), and the value of domestic inputs over
the value of total inputs (Panel C), for the three sectors. In line with Table 1, the figures in
Panel A first highlight that the value of inputs over the value of output is nearly twice as high
in manufacturing as in the other two sectors (66.13% in 1995 vs. 37.86% in the tradable
service sector). The figures in Panel A also point to increased outsourcing in the
manufacturing sector, as this share has increased by about 7 percentage points to 72.9% in
2007. The figures in Panel B reveal that this increase is entirely driven through increased use
of inputs from abroad as opposed to increased inputs from domestic industries, as the value
of domestic inputs has slightly decreased over the same period, from about 51.7% in 1995 to
51.2% in 2007. In consequence, the ratio of domestic inputs over the total inputs has
decreased in the manufacturing sector (as well as in the other sectors) over that period.
However, this decrease has not been dramatic, and even in 2007, 70% of inputs in the
manufacturing sector are domestically produced. Thus, based on these figures, the
argument that Germany’s manufacturing sector has become an assembly place for foreign
produced inputs, as argued by Sinn (2006) and mirrored in the public debate in Germany
during the mid-2000’s (see e.g. the front page story in the weekly “Der Spiegel” 2004), is
hardly justifiable. Rather, what the figures show is that a substantial fraction of the final
output value in manufacturing remains to be contributed by domestic inputs.
Table 3 focuses on the manufacturing sector, and shows the sector shares of the value of
overall (Panel A) and domestically produced (Panel B) inputs into manufacturing, while Panel
C provides the ratio of domestic to total inputs. For instance, for 1995, Panel A shows that
6%, 62%, and 32% of the value of inputs into manufacturing come from the non-tradable,
12
tradable manufacturing, and tradable service sectors. While the input of tradable services
into manufacturing has decreased overall, the share of domestic inputs has remained high,
and relatively constant, at around 90% (see Panel C). Thus, given that between 22% and 29%
of inputs into manufacturing stem from domestic tradable services, and around 4% from the
domestic non-tradable sector (see Panel B), the manufacturing sector may well have been
able to take advantage of the lower wage growth in these two other domestic sectors.
We next investigate to what extent domestic inputs have contributed to
competitiveness in the export oriented manufacturing sector and the two other sectors. In
Figure 4, we plot the evolution of unit labor costs in the three sectors (Panels A-C), where
industries are weighted with respect to their exports for the two tradable sectors.20 When
computing unit labor costs, we first consider only the value added in a sector (“value added”,
denoted by the solid line in Figure 4). We then consider total output value in the sector, that
is, the sum of value added in the sector and inputs from other sectors (“end products”,
denoted by the dotted lines in Figure 4). This latter index incorporates gains in
competitiveness in one sector due to the usage of inputs from other domestic sectors. We
also plot median real wages, adjusted using the CPI index, for the three sectors. While real
wage growth in the manufacturing sector is relatively modest, at about 8.2% over the 12
year period, it is—as Figure 3 suggests—considerably higher than in the other two sectors,
where average wages fell in real terms by 1.2% and 4.1%, respectively, over the same time
period. Thus, the overall competitiveness of tradable manufacturing industries, as measured
by unit labor costs in end products, may have partly improved because of the decline in real
wages in the two other sectors.
20 Details on how the figure was constructed can be found in Appendix B.
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Indeed, as visible in the figure, domestic unit labor cost for total production in manufac-
manufacturing, taking account of inputs produced in other sectors (”end products”),
declined far more rapidly than unit labor costs in value added, by about 27.9% as opposed to
6.5% over the 12 year period. Moreover, unit labor costs in end products start to decline
already at the start of the observation period, in 1995, while unit labor costs in value added
decrease rapidly only from 2002 onwards when mean wages, and in particular wages at the
15th percentile of the wage distribution start to decrease in real terms (see also Figure 3).
Thus, Germany’s manufacturing sector partly improved competitiveness by drawing on
inputs from domestically provided non-tradable and especially tradable services, where real
wages fell between 1995 and 2007. In comparison, total unit labor costs fell less in the Non-
Tradable Sectors (minus 22.2%) and much less in the Tradables Services (minus 9.7%), even
though nomial wage grew much less in these two sectors compared to Tradable
Manufacturing. Also note that, in line with the evidence in Table 1, the decline in unit labor
costs, coupled with the increase in mean real wages, implies that productivity increases in
the manufacturing sector have outpaced wage increases in that sector. Note also that
productivity increases in the manufacturing sector have exceeded the increases in the two
other sectors. Finally, a third factor which may have contributed to the increased
competitiveness of the manufacturing sector are inputs imported from abroad—which make
up 14.46% (66.13% minus 51.67%, see Table 2) of total output in the manufacturing sector in
1995, and 21.53% in 2007. Doing so, German manufacturing has made successful use of the
opportunities to outsource and offshore productions to low-wage countries in Eastern
Europe in order to increase the competitiveness of its own final products.21
21 This line of argument is consistent with the growing export surplus of Germany with the low wage countries
in Central and Eastern Europe (Dauth et al. 2012) and the rising integration of Central and Eastern Europe into
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3. How could the Increase in Competitiveness be accommodated by Germany’s Labor
Market Institutions?
Having demonstrated that the moderate increase in the level of real wages played an
important role in the favorable evolution of unit labor costs in the German tradable
manufacturing industry, we now investigate the mechanisms that allowed for overall wage
restraint, and for wages at the lower end of the wage distribution to decrease so
dramatically. The hypothesis we put forward here is that Germany’s labor market
institutions are not at all rigid, as commonly believed. We instead argue that the German
system of industrial relations offers various margins of flexibility, which led to an
unprecedented increase in the localization of the wage setting process. This started in the
early- to mid-1990’s and helped to bring down wages in particular at the lower end of the
wage distribution. In other words, we argue that key for the improvement in Germany’s
competitiveness since the mid-1990’s was an unprecedented move towards localization of
wage determination and working time, from the industry- and region-wide level to the level
of the single firm or even the single worker.
While a detailed account of the German system of industrial relations is beyond the
scope of this paper, the specific feature which we stress here is that it is not rooted in
legislation and it is not governed by the political process, but laid out in contracts and
mutual agreements between the three main labor market parties, these being trade unions,
the international division of labor as measured by a strong rise in Foreign direct investment of German firms
and growing intrafirm trade (Marin 2006). We also calculate the outsourcing indicator suggested by Egger and
Egger (2003, p. 642) for Germany, France, and Italy regarding imported inputs from Poland, Hungary, the Czech
and the Slovac Republic (Source: OECD Input-Output-Tables http://www.oecd.org/trade/input-
outputtables.htm and OECD International Trade and Balance of Payments Statistics
http://www.oecd.org/std/its/). Relative to GDP in the year 2000, imported inputs from these four countries
amount to about 8.5% in Germany, 2.5% in Italy, and 1.9% in France. Thus, Germany has made greater use of
trade integration with Eastern European countries compared to Italy and France.
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employer associations, and works councils (i.e., worker representatives which are typically
present in medium-sized and large firms).22 As such, there is no statutory minimum wage,
imposed by the political process, in Germany. Rather, there is an elaborate system of wage
floors, which are negotiated periodically between trade unions and employer associations,
typically at the industry and regional level, without the government exerting influence on
the parties. Importantly, the recognition of trade unions is at the discretion of the firm, and
union contracts cover only the workers in firms that recognize the relevant sectoral wage
bargaining (union) contract - regardless of whether the worker is a union member (see e.g.
OECD 2004, Fitzenberger et al. 2011 and Fitzenberger et al. 2013). Although still bound by
the union agreements for a transitory period, firms that once recognized the union contracts
can later opt out of the contracts at their own discretion. Below, we first show that the share
of workers covered by union agreements has sharply declined since 1995 (see also
Dustmann et al. 2009, Antonczyk et al., 2010), and then provide evidence that this erosion of
collective bargaining coverage caused wages to fall, in particular at the lower end of the
wage distribution.
Even within union wage contracts negotiated at the industry level, there is scope for
wage flexibility at the firm level through so-called “opening” or “hardship” clauses, provided
that workers’ representatives agree to this (see e.g., Hassel, 1999, Hassel and Rehder, 2001,
or Carlin and Soskice, 2009, Brändle et al. 2011, and Bispinck et al. 2010). Below, we show
that opening clauses have become increasingly common, and have further increased the
importance of firm-based works councils in wage determination relative to trade unions.
Other than trade unions, works councils have the benefit of the single firm at heart, and may
22 The principle of autonomy of wage bargaining is laid down in the German constitution and implies that nego-
tiations take place without the government directly exerting influence.
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thus be more prepared to agree to changes in wage agreements than unions if it helps to
maintain employment. Both de-unionization and firm-level deviation from industry-wide
agreements through opening clauses have led to an unprecedented increase in the
localization of the wage setting process. The localization hypothesis is consistent with the
findings in the literature that the rise in firm level differences in wages contributes strongly
to the rise in wage inequality in Germany (see Antonczyk et al., 2010 and Card et al., 2013).
3.1 Unions and Employer Associations
Contractual agreements between unions and employer associations are negotiated
either on the region-industry level, or on the firm level. In addition to wages, working time
regulations are an important component of the negotiations between unions and employer
associations.
Since the mid-1990’s, union coverage rates have declined sharply. While in 1995 only
14.1% of West German workers were neither covered by a firm- nor by an industry-wide
agreement, this number has more than doubled (to 34.6%) by 2008.23 This decline in union
coverage is almost entirely driven by a decline in industry-wide agreements. Has this
decrease in union coverage rates contributed to a reduction in wage growth and to an
increase in inequality? We investigate this in Figure 5, where we plot the observed changes
in log real wages between 1995 and 2008 along the wage distribution, together with the
counterfactual changes which we compute by keeping unionization rates at the same level
as in 1995.24 The figure clearly shows that wages in 2008 would have been higher if union
coverage had remained the same as in 1995 throughout the entire wage distribution, but
23 Own calculations based on the LIAB.
24 We use the re-weighting approach developed in DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) to recover the counter-
factual wage distribution.
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particularly so at the lower end of the wage distribution. For instance, the decline in union
coverage is associated with a decrease in real wages of 6.7% at the 15th percentile, of 3.8%
at the median, and 2.1% at the 85th percentile. Thus, the reduction in union coverage, partly
driven by employers leaving the employers’ associations, has contributed to the overall
wage restraint, and the fall in real wages at the lower parts of the wage distribution.
3.2 Works councils and Opening Clauses
Our analysis of wage inequality further reveals that wage inequality has also increased
strongly among employees covered by union contracts, thus suggesting that the German
system of industrial relations has allowed for flexibility even within the unionized sector.25
Next, we argue that this is due to the increased importance of works councils within that
sector. Works councils have to be set up in establishment with more than 5 employees when
demanded so by the employees, and the size of the works council then depends on the size
of the establishment. About 92 percent of employees in establishments that have more than
50 employees work in establishments with a works council, while it is only 18 percent of
employees in establishments that are smaller.26
Works councils have become more important since the beginning of the 1990s, when
industry-level collective bargaining came under increasing pressure from employers who
demanded more firm-specific, differentiated regulations. In response, the trade unions and
employers’ associations agreed on an increasing number of "opening clauses" in industry-
level collective agreements (first these were only opening clauses regarding hours of work
regulations only; later on these became opening clauses regarding also wages), which
25 Calculations based on the LIAB show that among employees covered by union wages, wages at the 15th per-
centile declined by 5.1%, while wages at the 85th percentile rose by 11.9%, between 1995 and 2008.
26 See Addison et al. (1997) and Beckmann et al. (2010).
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enlarged the scope of decision-making on the firm level. Opening clauses allow firms to de-
deviate from collectively agreed industry-wide standards, and to achieve differentiated
establishment agreements that are tailored at the needs of the particular firm. Initially, they
were only temporarily allowed for to avoid bankruptcy (hardship clauses); later they were
also implemented to ensure competitiveness in more general terms. They cover both pay
and working time agreements, and supersede the industry-level collective bargaining
agreements. Firms that use opening clauses negotiate the details concerning pay and
working time agreements with the works council.27
Brändle et al. (2011, figure 1) report that opening clauses for wages only started to gain
importance in 1995 (which is about the time when wage inequality at the bottom of the
wage distribution started to increase considerably). Among industry-wide collective
contracts in manufacturing, in 1995 less than 5% involved opening clauses for wages, while
this number increased to about 60% in 2004. Bispinck (2007) reports that, according to a
survey of works councils in 2005, about 75 percent of all firms with collective agreements
use opening clauses (see also Bispinck et al. 2010). As a result, even though the industry-
wide collective wage contracts are still the most prevalent form of regulation of pay and
work conditions in the German labor market, they have lost strength and power of impact in
favor of works councils.
4. What led to higher Flexibility of the German Labor Market?
Why did the inherent flexibility in Germany’s labor market institutions come to bear only
from the mid-1990’s onwards and not earlier, in the sense that it lead to visible wage
27 Firms without a works council cannot use opening clauses. Instead, such firms may decide to stop recognizing
a union contract. Firms with a works council not covered by a union contract may reach an agreement on wag-
es with the works council.
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restraint and decreasing real wages at the lower end of the wage distribution? After all,
firms have always had the option not to recognize a union contract and to pay wages below
the union wage, and opening clauses had been possible before the mid-1990’s. The short
answer is that none of the changes in the economic conditions has put the German
economy, which is, and has always been much export oriented, in such a dramatic situation
as the fall of the Berlin wall and the opening up of Middle and Eastern European economies
to the market model. On the one hand, the extraordinary cost of German unification
burdened the German economy in an unprecedented way, which is partly responsible for
the Germany’s dismal performance throughout the 1990’s and early 2000’s.28 On the other
hand, Central and Eastern European countries constituted a unique opportunity for German
industry to move production abroad, for two reasons. First, it was clear very early on that
political stability and a firm commitment to the market model would create a stable
investment climate, with little risks and uncertainties. Second, despite being locked away for
several decades behind the iron curtain, most Central European countries had a long history
of trade and interaction with Germany. The structure of industry and education systems for
instance, shared many similarities, which survived the Soviet era. For example, vocational
training plays, similar to Germany, a key role in the education system in countries like
Hungary or Poland. German was also a language widely spoken in parts of Central and
Eastern Europe. At the same time, wages in these countries were far lower than in Germany,
and working regulations more flexible (see e.g. Geishecker 2006, Marin 2006). Although in
28 The German Council of Economic experts (SVR 2004, Table 100, p. 644) estimates net transfers of about 900
billion Euros from former West Germany to East Germany during the time period 1991 to 2003. The total sum
of net transfers corresponds to about 48% of the average of one year’s GDP during that time period.
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the end moving production abroad to these countries took place at a moderate pace29 and
Germany experienced a growing export surplus30, the threat of German firms to locate
production to these low-wage countries was very credible, and widely discussed in public
(see, for instance, DIHK 2003, FAZ 2004, and Der Spiegel 2004, the latter two being among
the key German media outlets).
Therefore, the fiscal burden of German re-unification, coupled with an ever more
competitive global environment, made it increasingly costly for firms to recognize the union
and pay high union wages. At the same time, new opportunities to move production abroad,
changed the power equilibrium between trade unions and employer federations, and forced
unions and/or works councils to accept, through opening clauses, deviations from industry-
wide agreements which often resulted in lower wages for workers. Unions’ willingness to
agree to opening clauses was reinforced by the fact that firms could opt out, or threaten to
opt out, of collective agreements altogether which put unions in a situation in which they
realized that they had to make concessions in order not be further marginalized. In that
situation, trade unions reacted in a way far more flexibly than many would ever have
expected, and Germany’s economic institutions allowed them to do so.
5. Discussion and Outlook
We argue in this paper that the remarkable transformation of the German economy from
the "sick man of Europe" to a lean and highly competitive economy within little more than a
decade, is rooted in the inherent flexibility of the German system of industrial relations. This
29The stock of German foreign direct investment to Poland, Hungary, as well as the Czech and the Slovak repub-
lics amounted to only about 1% of German GDP in 2000 and to about 2.3% in 2010 (Source:
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=FDI_POSITION_PARTNER and own calculations).
30See Dauth et al. (2012), who reports that growing international trade with Eastern Europe has been associat-
ed with employment gains in Germany.
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system allowed German industry to react appropriately and flexibly to the demands of Ger-
German unification, and the global challenges of a new world economy. Although the
potential flexibilities within the system to localize negotiations always existed, firms had
little incentives to use them in the relatively positive economic climate until the late 1980’s.
This dramatically changed in the early to mid-1990’s, when the immense cost of German re-
unification, coupled with an increasingly competitive global environment, and helped by
new opportunities of outsourcing to Eastern European countries, changed the power
balance between employee representatives and employers, and unleashed a continuing
process of wage de-centralization, both in the form of shrinking union coverage and in the
form of firm-level deviations from industry-wide collective agreements, through opening
clauses. Most likely, this development did not only bring down overall wages, but also led to
a dramatic increase in wage inequality below the median, which until that point had, in
sharp contrast to the UK and US, changed remarkably little. As we argue in this paper, it is
these processes, together with an increase in productivity, which led to an increase of
competitiveness of Germany relative to all its main trading partners.
But why did other Continental European countries not react in the same way? First, the
particular economic situation in which Germany found itself in the early 1990’s was to a
large part specific to Germany, and was not felt in the same way in other countries. It is only
later that countries like Italy and France felt the pressures of globalization and increased
competition mainly from Asian countries, possibly being reinforced by the introduction of
the Euro. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the system of industrial relations in other
Continental European countries does not allow for the same inherent opportunities of
flexible adaptation as the German system. For example, in countries like France and Italy,
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union wages, often bargained at the national level, apply to all firms in the economy, regard-
regardless of whether the firm explicitly recognizes the union contract.31 More generally,
many of the regulations which are contractual in Germany are either legally enforced in
other countries (such as the minimum wage in France) or nationally implemented (e.g.,
union agreements extend to all firms in the economy), and therefore require consent on a
much higher level (nationally, or even on the political level) to be modified and changed.
Only recently similar efforts of flexibilisation, although yet very limited, have become
apparent. For instance, Fiat’s CEO Sergio Marchionne has initiated in 2011 changes in
industrial relations in Italy, with a shift toward the practice of regional and local bargaining
over the traditional model of national agreements. Similar to the German situation in the
mid-1990’s, this shift has been the result of a tremendous economic pressure on Fiat, lacking
competitiveness due to high labor costs, coupled with the threat of Marchionne to take
production away from Italy. So far, however, this development has not been implemented
more widely, but the decentralization of union agreements is certainly discussed.
Will other European countries be able to improve their competitiveness, through a
similar process of restructuring and localization of wage and working hours negotiations?
The answer depends on two factors. First, will their institutions allow such changes? Second,
will the power balance between employer and employee associations shift in a direction that
allows for such changes? The example of Fiat suggests that institutional changes are in
principle possible. However, whether the small and medium sized employers in Italy that are
31 In Italy and France, coverage by union wage contracts has remained remarkably stable at very high levels (at
about 90% in France and 80% in Italy) during the 1990s and the 2000s, see OECD (2004, 2012). Furthermore, in
contrast to Germany, union wage contracts are typically extended to all workers in an industry (see OECD 2004,
Table 3.4, p. 148). Adding flexibility into collective agreements would require political reforms at the national
level.
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so characteristic for the Italian economy will be able to achieve local agreements in the same
way as Fiat remains to be seen.
In sum, we conclude that the localization of agreements affecting pay and working
conditions was the key factor in improving the competitiveness of German industry. Our
view therefore differs from the commonly presented argument that the improvement in
German competitiveness has been the result of the labor market reforms implemented
under the government of Gerhard Schröder, the so-called “Hartz Reforms” (see e.g. Rinne
and Zimmermann, 2013). These reforms essentially reduced and limited the benefits while
unemployed, liberalized agency work, reformed active labor market policies, and
reorganized the Federal Labor Agency. These reforms were implemented starting in 2003,
hence nearly a decade after the process of wage decentralization, and the improvement in
competitiveness, had begun in Germany. We therefore believe that these reforms were not
essential in this process, although they may have contributed to the recent decline in long-
term unemployment and to the continued increase in wage inequality at the lower end of
the wage distribution. In consequence, the argument that other European countries can go
the same path than Germany, where all that is needed is the political will to implement
similar reforms, brought forward by economists and politicians alike, may be misleading.
Clearly, the inherent flexibilities built into Germany’s system of industrial relations have
paved the way for the remarkable localization of wage determination, from the industry
level to the level of the single firm or single worker, which together with a significant
increase in productivity ultimately improved Germany’s competitiveness. Whether the
political process alone would have been able to achieve a similar degree of wage
decentralization, had these flexibilities not existed, is doubtful. Nevertheless, Germany’s
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experience suggests that reforms targeting the system of industrial relations, by decentraliz-
decentralizing bargaining to the firm level within the scope of the existing labor market
institutions keeping workers’ representatives involved, can improve the competitiveness of
Continental European countries.
Some argue that it is the common European currency that has helped Germany to
improve competitiveness. Again, we believe that that may have been one factor, but
certainly not the main one, for various reasons. First, as we show in Figure 1, Germany has
improved its competitiveness already during the 1990’s, before the introduction of a
common currency in 2001. Second, within the common currency area, and after 2001,
Germany continued to gain competitiveness with respect to its main trading partners like
Italy and Spain (again see figure 1). Third, the Euro, upon its introduction in 1999, and after a
brief period of depreciation, persistently appreciated against the dollar, leading to the
increase in competitiveness of the US. At least until the onset of the great recession, the
Deutschmark (if the Euro had not been introduced) might not have appreciated much more
against the dollar than the Euro has. It may have after the recession, but this is possibly
more related to the nature of the German economy where the contamination of the
financial sector was less severe than in the US or the UK. And finally, it is not clear whether
an appreciation of a German currency (which probably would have taken place not before
2009) would have had a dramatic impact on overall competitiveness. For example, the
depreciation of the pound by nearly 30% in 2008/2009 has done very little to help
manufacturing exports for the UK.
What the Euro does for the countries within the Eurozone is another matter. Certainly,
lacking the possibility of depreciation of national currencies, the only way to gain
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competitiveness for countries like France, Italy and Spain is to reduce unit labor costs,
through increasing productivity relative to real wages. Critics of the common currency claim
that this is a main disadvantage. However, it increases the pressure for these countries to
improve the flexibility of their labor market institutions and to restructure their economies –
which is important to survive in the global market, and which would be less likely to happen
without the straightjacket of the Euro and the possibility of depreciation. Whether these
countries will succeed in this endeavor remains an open question. The more centralized and
legally anchored nature of their labor market institutions, in comparison to Germany, puts
them certainly at a disadvantage (see also Boeri 2011 and Carlin 2012).
What is the outlook? Recent negotiations between employers and employee
associations in Germany suggest that future wage settlements will try to make good for the
loss in real wages many workers experienced. Also, having recognized their loss of influence,
unions are increasingly pressuring for new legislation that sets minimum standards on
national level, and these demands are party supported by politicians. The recently discussed
introduction of a nationally binding minimum wage is only one example.32 Thus, while
Germany may still be able to improve its competitiveness through increases in productivity,
the possibilities to do that by reducing labor costs seem limited in the future. This may help
convergence between competitiveness of the countries in the Eurozone.
7998 words
32 For instance, the German chancellor Angela Merkel agrees in 2013 to the introduction of a minimum wage,
for cases where no union wage contract exists or is recognized.
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Appendix A: Data
Our main analyses are based on data from two institutions: First, the Institute for
Employment Research (IAB), and second, the German Federal Statistical Office (FSO).
IAB data
From the IAB, we use two data sources, the SIAB, a 2% random sample of social security
records, and the LIAB, a linked employer–employee data set.Although the SIAB is in principle
available from 1975-2008, we show results here for the time period 1990-2008. The data is
representative of all individuals covered by the social security system, roughly 80% of the
German workforce. It excludes the self-employed, civil servants, individuals currently doing
their (compulsory) military service, and individuals on so-called “marginal jobs” (i.e., jobs
with at most fifteen hours per week or temporary jobs that last no longer than six weeks). A
detailed description of the data can be found in Dorner et al. (2010). The data set includes
information on daily wages. The wage information has the advantage of being very accurate,
as it stems from administrative records of the employers. On the downside, wages are top-
coded at the social security contribution threshold. For employees with censored wage
information, we impute and replace the right-censored wages using an imputation algorithm
developed originally for the IABS (the predecessor of the SIAB) by Gartner (2005). To
construct real daily wages, we deflate nominal daily wages by the common consumer price
index (base year: 2000) for West Germany provided by the Federal Statistical Office.
We restrict the sample to full-time workers (men and women) who are between 20 and
60 years old for the analyses concerning wages. We also exclude those working in the
agricultural sector. When calculating labor inputs into sectors (or when calculating the wage
bill), we use the information in the SIAB on employment spells, involving the length of
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employment in days and taking into account both full-time and part-time workers (again
men and women).
The results involving information on unionization are based on the LIAB, a linked
employer–employee data set also provided by the IAB. A detailed description of this data set
can be found in Jacobebbinghaus and Seth (2010). Although the LIAB is principally available
from 1993 to 2008, information on union coverage exists from 1995 only. The LIAB combines
information from the IAB Establishment Panel with information on all workers who were
employed in these firms as of the 30th of June. The information on workers is drawn from
the same social security records as the SIAB data. We impose the same sample restrictions
as in the wage analysis for the SIAB, and use the sample weights provided to make our
results representative for workers.
FSO data
For the calculation of input shares and unit labor costs, we rely on input-output tables
from the German Federal Statistical Office (Source: https://www.destatis.de/DE/
Publikationen/Thematisch/VolkswirtschaftlicheGesamtrechnungen/InputOutputRechnung/Input
OutputRechnungUeberblick5815116099004.pdf?__blob=publicationFile), that give a detailed
representation of the interdependencies between different sectors of the German economy.
This data is available for the Federal Republic of Germany only, that is for East and West
Germany combined. In this data, the German economy is categorized into 71 sectors. We
use data from 1995 to 2007 because changes in classification systems make consistent
analyses for years before 1995 and after 2007 difficult.
We rely on the information on export volumes in these data when categorizing the
sectors into non-tradable sectors, tradable manufacturing, and tradable services. We classify
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sectors with export volumes below the 25th percentile of the distribution of export volumes
in 1995 as “non-tradable sectors”, and those with export volumes above this threshold and
that belong to the manufacturing sector as “tradable manufacturing”. The sectors above this
threshold that do not belong to the manufacturing sector are classified as “tradable
services”. A detailed list of sectors is provided by the authors upon request. Note that all our
analyses are robust to changes in the classification schemes.
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Appendix B: Calculation of total real unit labor costs
Calculation of total real unit labor costs in figure 4 (Unit labor costs: “End product”):

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with ߚ௜௝=inverse coefficient from domestic production (tells you how much from
production of sector i goes into final unit of sector j as used by final demand). The inverse
coefficients are taken from the input-output tables of the German Federal Statistical Offices.
ݐݑ݈ܿ௝ are total domestic unit labor costs per € of production and ݌ݑ݈ܿ௝are total direct
labor costs in sector j per € of production.
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The total wage bill is taken from the SIAB data (including full-time and part-time
workers)
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based on data on employment spells involving the length of employment in days and the
reported daily wage. The output value involves total production (“Gesamte Verwendung von
Gütern”) of sector i from the German input-output tables.
To assess the change in competitiveness, the industries in the tradable sectors are
weighted by their export values in 1995. There is no weighting for the Non-Tradable sectors.
Direct unit labor costs in Figure 4 only consider the value added in the respective industries
(“Unit Labor Costs: Value Added”), not total production. Unit labor costs in the respective
industries as a whole (“Unit Labor Costs: End Product”) considers total production in that
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sector, i.e. both the value added and inputs from other sectors, again weighting industries
with respect to their export values in 1995 for the tradable sectors.
Year Non-
Tradable
Tradable
Services
Tradable
Manufacturing
Non-
Tradable
Tradable
Services
Tradable
Manufacturing
Non-
Tradable
Tradable
Services
Tradable
Manufacturing
1995 0.326 0.341 0.332 0.282 0.490 0.227 0.244 0.406 0.350
1996 0.324 0.346 0.330 0.287 0.488 0.225 0.242 0.403 0.354
1997 0.324 0.351 0.325 0.284 0.497 0.219 0.234 0.400 0.366
1998 0.326 0.354 0.320 0.279 0.494 0.226 0.235 0.413 0.352
1999 0.329 0.360 0.311 0.280 0.501 0.218 0.232 0.421 0.347
2000 0.325 0.367 0.308 0.286 0.496 0.218 0.227 0.413 0.360
2001 0.322 0.372 0.306 0.282 0.502 0.216 0.222 0.417 0.361
2002 0.325 0.374 0.301 0.283 0.505 0.212 0.223 0.421 0.356
2003 0.326 0.375 0.299 0.282 0.506 0.212 0.224 0.421 0.355
2004 0.325 0.378 0.297 0.277 0.504 0.219 0.217 0.417 0.365
2005 0.324 0.383 0.294 0.276 0.507 0.217 0.213 0.416 0.371
2006 0.323 0.389 0.288 0.272 0.505 0.223 0.209 0.408 0.383
2007 0.323 0.393 0.284 0.270 0.505 0.225 0.205 0.402 0.393
Table 1: Evolution of Employment, Value Added, and Output Value by Sector for the German Economy, in Percent of Total, 1995-2007.
Note: Calculations based on input-output statistics from the German Statistical Office (Fachserie 18, Reihe 2, Years: 1995-2007). We classify sectors with
export volumes below the 25th percentile of the distribution of export volumes in 1995 as “non-tradable sectors”, and those with export volumes above
this threshold and that belong to the manufacturing sector as “tradable manufacturing”. The sectors above this threshold that do not belong to the
manufacturing sector are classified as “tradable services”.
Employment Shares Value Added Shares Output Value Shares
1995 48.22 39.91 66.13 37.86
2000 50.98 37.92 70.07 41.42
2007 53.20 38.21 72.9 41.63
1995 39.81 35.25 51.67 32.39
2000 40.29 32.19 51.65 34.78
2007 40.49 32.07 51.23 34.23
1995 82.56 88.32 78.13 85.55
2000 79.03 84.89 73.71 83.97
2007 76.11 83.93 70.27 82.22
Panel C: (Value of Domestic Inputs/Value of Total Inputs)*100
Tradable
Manufacturing
Table 2: Evolution of the Share of Value of Total Inputs and Domestic
Inputs over the Value of Output, Overall and by Sector, 1995-2007.
Note: Calculations based on input-output statistics from the German
Statistical Office (Fachserie 18, Reihe 2, Years: 1995-2007). We classify sectors
with export volumes below the 25th percentile of the distribution of export
volumes in 1995 as “non-tradable sectors”, and those with export volumes
above this threshold and that belong to the manufacturing sector as “tradable
manufacturing”. The sectors above this threshold that do not belong to the
manufacturing sector are classified as “tradable services”.
Overall Non-
Tradable
Tradable
Services
Panel A: (Value of Inputs/Output Value)*100
Panel B: (Value of Domestic Inputs/Output Value)*100
Tradable Tradable
Manufacturing Services
1995 6.13 61.94 31.92
2000 7.07 64.05 28.87
2007 8.01 67.30 24.68
1995 4.45 44.81 29.35
2000 3.91 44.05 26.27
2007 3.93 44.92 22.15
1995 72.59 72.34 91.95
2000 55.30 68.77 90.99
2007 49.06 66.75 89.75
Table 3: Evolution of the Sector Composition of the Value of Inputs into
Tradable Manufacturing, 1995-2007.
Note: Calculations based on input-output statistics from the German Statistical
Office (Fachserie 18, Reihe 2, Years: 1995-2007). We classify sectors with
export volumes below the 25th percentile of the distribution of export volumes
in 1995 as “non-tradable sectors”, and those with export volumes above this
threshold and that belong to the manufacturing sector as “tradable
manufacturing”. The sectors above this threshold that do not belong to the
manufacturing sector are classified as “tradable services”.
Non-Tradable
Sectors
Panel A: Sector Shares of Value of Inputs
Panel B: Sector Shares of Value of Domestic Inputs
Panel C: (Value of Domestic Inputs/Value of Total Inputs)*100
See OECD Economic Outlook, Volume 2012 Issue 2 - No. 92 and OECD Economic Outlook Sources and Methods (http://www.oecd.org/eco/sources-and-
methods) for details on the method of calculation.
Figure 1: Evolution of Competition-Weighted Relative Unit Labor Costs, Selected Countries, 1994-2012.
Source: OECD Economic Indicators.
The unit labour costs are translated into in US dollars using the exchange rate e_it. Both the unit labor costs and the exchange rates are defined as
index relative to some base year. The weighting scheme g_ij^(t-1) takes account of the structure of competition in both export and import markets of
the goods sector of those countries, and it adjusts on a year-by-year basis.
Note: These indices accumulate the annual change in the relative unit labor costs of country i compared to a weighted average of its main trading
partners where labor costs are translated into dollars and the weights are adjusted annually to the change in trade pattern.
The annual change in logs is calculated as ∆log(RULC_it) = ∆log(ULC_it*e_it) -Σj≠i g_ij^(t-1)  ∆log(ULC_it*e_it) where ULC_it = (w_it*L_it)/Y_it are the 
unit labor cost for country i in period t, computed as the total wage bill w_it L_it divided by the value added of the country’s industry Y_it.
Figure 2: Indexed Wage Growth of the 15th, 50th, 85th Percentiles, West Germany, 1990-
2008.
Note: Calculations based on SIAB Sample for West German Full-Time Workers between 20 and 60
years of age. The figure shows the indexed (log) real wage growth of the 15th, 50th, and 85th
percentiles of the wage distribution, with 1990 as the base year.
Nominal wages are deflated using the consumer price index (1995=100) provided by the German
Federal Statistical Office.
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Figure 3: Indexed Wage Growth of the 15th, 50th, 85th Percentiles, West Germany, by Sectors, 1990-2008.
Panel A: Non-Tradable Panel B: Tradable Manufacturing
Panel C: Tradable Services
Note: Calculations based on SIAB Sample for West German Full-Time Workers between 20 and 60 years of age. The figures show the indexed (log) real wage
growth of the 15th, 50th, and 85th percentiles of the wage distribution, with 1990 as the base year. Nominal wages are deflated using the consumer price index
(1995=100) provided by the German Federal Statistical Office. Panel A shows the evolution of these figures for the non-tradable sectors, Panel B for tradable
manufacturing and Panel C for tradable services. We classify sectors with export volumes below the 25th percentile of the distribution of export volumes in
1995 as “non-tradable sectors”, and those with export volumes above this threshold and that belong to the manufacturing sector as “tradable manufacturing”.
The sectors above this threshold that do not belong to the manufacturing sector are classified as “tradable services”.
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Panel A: Non-Tradable Sectors Panel B: Tradable Manufacturing
Panel C: Tradable Services
Note: The figures show indexed real mean daily wages by sector
(base year 1995=100). Nominal wages are deflated using the
consumer price index (1995=100) provided by the German Federal
Statistical Office. The data underlying these indices are in columns
(1), (4), and (7) of "Appendix Table 1".
The figure also shows indexed unit labor costs both "Value Added"
and "End Product" by sector. The data underlying these indices are
in columns (2), (3), (5), (6), (8) and (9) of "Appendix Table 1".
"Appendix Table 1" includes a detailed description of data and
methods of calculations.
Figure 4: Evolution of Real Daily Wages and Unit Labor Costs by Sector, 1995-2007.
Figure 5: Observed vs Counterfactual Wage Growth between 1995 and 2008 along the Wage
Distribution: The Role of De-Unionization
Note: The figure shows the observed wage growth by percentile between 1995 and 2008, as well as
the counterfactual wage growth which would have prevailed if the share of workers covered either by
industry-wide or firm-wide agreements had remained at its 1995 level. The counterfactual wage
distribution is computed using the re-weighting approach developed by DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux
(1996). Calculations are based in the LIAB.
Year
Real Daily
Wage
(in Euro)
Unit Labor
Costs:
"Value
Added"
Unit Labor
Costs: "End
Products"
Real Daily
Wage
(in Euro)
Unit Labor
Costs:
"Value
Added"
Unit Labor
Costs: "End
Products"
Real Daily
Wage
(in Euro)
Unit Labor
Costs:
"Value
Added"
Unit Labor
Costs: "End
Products"
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1995 87.92 0.80 0.26 74.80 6.37 0.20 81.34 0.46 0.041
1996 88.15 0.81 0.27 73.75 5.96 0.19 81.30 0.46 0.041
1997 87.88 0.81 0.26 72.84 5.83 0.19 80.87 0.45 0.040
1998 88.95 0.78 0.25 74.01 6.02 0.18 81.61 0.45 0.039
1999 90.52 0.79 0.25 75.11 6.09 0.19 82.86 0.46 0.039
2000 91.56 0.82 0.24 74.95 5.92 0.18 83.07 0.48 0.039
2001 91.24 0.84 0.23 74.62 5.93 0.18 83.20 0.48 0.040
2002 92.36 0.84 0.24 74.63 5.81 0.17 83.81 0.47 0.040
2003 94.05 0.82 0.23 75.1 5.76 0.17 84.44 0.46 0.041
2004 93.99 0.79 0.22 74.04 5.66 0.16 83.38 0.45 0.039
2005 93.72 0.78 0.21 73.25 5.53 0.16 82.92 0.45 0.038
2006 95.02 0.75 0.2 72.82 5.46 0.15 82.27 0.45 0.037
2007 95.11 0.75 0.19 71.77 5.46 0.15 80.36 0.46 0.037
Change in %
(1995-2007) 8.18 -6.52 -27.86 -4.05 -14.37 -22.18 -1.21 -0.17 -9.70
pulci=WBi/Output_Valuei_in_current Euro. So tulcj are total domestic unit labor costs per € of production and pulcj are total direct labor costs in sector j per € of
production.
Export data, data on output value and value added, as well as the inverse coefficients are taken from the input-output tables of the German Federal Statistical
Offices (Fachserie 18, Reihe 2, Years: 1995-2007).
Appendix Table 1: Evolution of Real Daily Wages and Unit Labor Costs by Sector, 1995-2007.
Column (5) and (6) include information that is analogue to that in column (2), (3), (8), and (9), but is not export weighted.
Notes: Calculations in Column (1), (4), and (7), are based on SIAB Sample for West German Full-Time Workers between 20 and 60 years of age. They show the
evolution of the mean of real daily wages by sector and by year (using Tobit regressions).
Nominal wages are deflated using the consumer price index (1995=100) provided by the German Federal Statistical Office.
Column (2) and (8), shows the export weighted total wage bill by sector and by year; calculated based on the SIAB data, including full-time and part-time workers
(WBi=Σspell_i days*dailywage, with dailywage being the nomial daily wage).
Column (3) and (9): Unit Labor Costs "End Product" is the export weighted mean of total real unit labor costs across sectors j (tulcj), with tulcj=Σ
I
i=1bij*pulci, and
βij=inverse coefficient from domestic production (tells you how much from production of sector i goes into final unit of sector j as used by final demand, as going
into exports), and
Tradable Manufacturing Non-Tradable Sectors Tradable Services
